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Chapter XXV
e-Infrastructures Fostering 
Multi-Centre Collaborative 
Research into the Intensive Care 
Management of Patients with 
Brain Injury
Richard O. Sinnott
University of Glasgow, UK
Ian Piper
Southern General Hospital, Glasgow, UK
Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
AbstrAct
Clinical research is becoming ever more collaborative with multi-centre trials now a common practice. 
With this in mind, never has it been more important to have secure access to data and, in so doing, tackle 
the challenges of inter-organisational data access and usage. This is especially the case for research 
conducted within the brain injury domain due to the complicated multi-trauma nature of the disease with 
its associated complex collation of time-series data of varying resolution and quality. It is now widely 
accepted that advances in treatment within this group of patients will only be delivered if the technical 
infrastructures underpinning the collection and validation of multi-centre research data for clinical tri-
als is improved. In recognition of this need, IT-based multi-centre e-Infrastructures such as the Brain 
Monitoring with Information Technology group (BrainIT - www.brainit.org) and Cooperative Study on 
Brain Injury Depolarisations (COSBID - www.cosbid.de) have been formed. A serious impediment to the 
effective implementation of these networks is access to the know-how and experience needed to install, 
deploy and manage security-oriented middleware systems that provide secure access to distributed hos-
pital based datasets and especially the linkage of these data sets across sites. The recently funded EU 
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1. IntroductIon
Traumatic brain injury (TBI), also known as 
head injury, is a significant clinical problem. The 
incidence of severe TBI is approximately 200 pa-
tients/100,000 population with the most common 
causes including road traffic accidents, falls and 
assaults.  Males are more than twice as likely to 
receive a severe injury than woman and currently 
the reported mortality rate following severe TBI 
ranges from less than 10% up to 50% with the 
most common rate quoted between 20-30%. Al-
though the incidence of TBI is significantly less 
than those of other major medical diseases such 
as cardiovascular disease, cancer and stroke, as 
TBI occurs mostly in the young and the resultant 
morbidity is severe and long-lasting, the burden of 
TBI to the individual, their carers and the society 
that supports them is as great if not greater than 
the other disease domains. On a European level, 
fifty percent of the years individuals spend with 
disability are caused by brain disease of which 
traumatic brain injury now carries an equal bur-
den to patients as do those of cerebrovascular and 
depressive illness disorders (Olesen 2003).  
After ten years of pharmaceutical industry 
sponsored drug development and despite promis-
ing pre-clinical data, most of the clinical trials of 
these agents have failed to show any significant 
improvement in patient outcome (Narayan 2002). 
Many researchers feel a significant cause under-
lying this lack of success is the poor resolution 
of paper based methods for detection of adverse 
events and poor methods for monitoring of and 
controlling for protocol violations and medica-
tion errors. These limitations combine to make 
it difficult to detect small but clinically important 
treatment effects in the general noise of the brain 
injured patient management environment. The 
poor success rate of TBI clinical trials combined 
with the high cost to the pharmaceutical industry to 
conduct phase III trials in brain injury has, in recent 
years, caused a reluctance of the pharmaceutical 
industry to bring forward promising compounds to 
clinical trial in the field of brain injury. The high 
cost of conducting clinical trials is due in large 
part for the need to hire specially trained staff to 
collect and validate data. If technical solutions 
could be developed to reduce, even partially, the 
need for human resources in the data collection/
validation process, potentially enormous savings 
could be made by these organisations. These ef-
ficiencies would ensure the organisations’ longer 
term sustainability, and the lower running costs 
would reduce the cost of service delivery. Above 
all, this would improve the overall patient care.  
This chapter focuses upon how Grid based 
infrastructures can help to address these issues. 
We focus in particular on the aspects of usability 
and security of Grid based e-Infrastructures and 
illustrate with examples from a range of projects 
at the National e-Science Centre at the University 
of Glasgow, how the vision of the Grid in provid-
ing seamless access to a range of heterogeneous 
resources (such as a variety of neurological data 
resources) can be undertaken in a secure, ethical 
framework where information governance and 
associated policy is paramount. 
framework VII ICT project Advanced Arterial Hypotension Adverse Event prediction through a Novel 
Bayesian Neural Network (AVERT-IT) is focused upon tackling these challenges. This chapter describes 
the problems inherent to data collection within the brain injury medical domain, the current IT-based 
solutions designed to address these problems and how they perform in practice. The authors outline how 
the authors have collaborated towards developing Grid solutions to address the major technical issues. 
Towards this end we describe a prototype solution which ultimately formed the basis for the AVERT-IT 
project.  They describe the design of the underlying Grid infrastructure for AVERT-IT and how it will be 
used to produce novel approaches to data collection, data validation and clinical trial design.
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2. bAckGround to brAIn 
trAuMA rEsEArch And brAInIt
There is increasing evidence that targeted use 
of IT can improve patient health care.  A review 
article by Bates and Gawande (Bates 2003) 
outline several trials of IT technology that have 
decreased medication errors, errors of omission 
from poor handoffs between clinical staff and 
providing earlier detection of adverse events. A 
good example of this can be found in the work by 
Kupermann (Kupermann 1999) in a randomised 
control trial of IT for the earlier detection of ad-
verse events which showed an 11% reduction in 
the time to treatment and a 29% reduction in the 
overall duration of dangerous adverse conditions 
to patients. Rosenfield and colleagues (Rosenfield 
2000) reported on a study of IT based remote 
monitoring of a multi-bed intensive care unit and 
found a reduction in mortality with a reduced 
length of stay of nearly 30% when compared to 
historical controls.
Critics of this type of research will point out 
that better resolution of events is of no value un-
less their direct management influences patient 
outcome.  Providing this type of evidence from 
single-centre studies with small patient numbers is 
not an efficient approach to answer these questions, 
and multi-centre studies conducting trials of new 
IT driven management is not readily funded nor 
easily justified as a research priority. Paradoxi-
cally, the patient populations which might benefit 
most from better IT-driven event detection and 
management standardisation would be the TBI 
population but this is also the most challenging in 
which to conduct such studies due to the continu-
ing inter-centre management variation fostered to 
a large part by a lack of evidence for any type of 
effective therapy (Bulger 2002).
With this background in mind, certain indi-
viduals working within the field of TBI research 
met to discuss the foundation and development of 
a network for creating an IT based infrastructure 
aimed at improving the standards for multi-centre 
studies of monitoring and managing patients with 
traumatic brain injury during their acute stay in 
intensive care. It was agreed a different approach 
was needed, one which focused on using IT-based 
methods towards not only increasing the resolution 
of data capture but also the quality and valida-
tion of data captured. The pervasive nature of the 
internet and extensive use by clinicians of email 
systems fostered the creation of such a network 
as an internet based e-Infrastructure: the BrainIT 
group (www.brainit.org). 
The BrainIT group works collaboratively on 
developing standards for collection and analy-
ses of data from brain injured patients towards 
providing a more efficient infrastructure for as-
sessing new health technology. Over a period of 
12 months and four international meetings, the 
group have defined a core dataset designed to be 
collected using PC based tools and providing a 
common minimal dataset for all studies, regard-
less of the underlying research question. This 
data definition period was funded as part of an 
EC study (QLGT-2000-00454). The meetings 
brought together clinical and scientific experts 
from the domain of TBI basic research and also 
in the conduct of multi-centre clinical trials 
such as the European Brain Injury Consortium 
(EBIC – www.ebic.nl) as well as representatives 
from the medical device and pharmaceutical 
industries.  A series of meetings and workshops 
spread over one year enabled the group to define 
a minimum set of data that could be collected 
from all patients with TBI, which would be use-
ful in most research projects conducted in this 
population of patients.  To facilitate discussion, 
the core dataset was sub-divided into four logical 
groups: a) demographic and clinical Information, 
b) minute by minute monitoring information, c) 
intensive care management information, and d) 
secondary insult treatment information. 
From these series of meetings a consensus data-
set was formed which includes nine categories: 
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1. Demographic and one-off clinical data, 
e.g. pre-neurosurgical hospital data, first 
and worst CT scan data etc; 
2. Daily management data, e.g. daily summary 
measures of the use of sedatives, analgesics, 
vasopressors, fluid input/output balance 
etc; 
3. Laboratory data, e.g. blood gas,  haematol-
ogy, biochemistry data etc; 
4. Event data, e.g. nursing manoeuvers, physio-
therapy, medical procedures (line insertion), 
calibrations etc; 
5. Surgical procedures; 
6. Monitoring data summary, e.g. the type 
and placement location of Intra-Cranial 
Pressures (ICP) sensors, Blood Pressure 
(BP) lines, etc;
7. Neuro-event summary, e.g. Glasgow Coma 
Scores (GCS), pupil size and reactivity;
8. Targeted therapies, e.g. mannitol given 
for raised ICP, pressor given for arterial 
hypotension etc;
9. Vital monitoring data, e.g. minute by minute 
BP, ICP, SaO2 etc collected from the bedside 
monitoring.
The full details of the core dataset definition 
and the collaboration structure of the group can 
be found in the BrainIT publication: BrainIT 
Group – core concept and data definition (Piper 
2003). Unique to other dataset definitions, the 
BrainIT core dataset defined a special approach 
to quantify secondary insult management. This 
is medical management therapy given to patients 
specifically to treat secondary insults which occur 
to patients despite their baseline intensive care 
medical management. To distinguish therapy 
given to patients to treat secondary insults from 
those of baseline intensive care, we have devised 
a coding system which allows specific categories 
of therapy to be assigned a ‘‘therapy target’’. For 
example, arterial pressors may be given to treat 
systemic hypotension or to treat reduced cerebral 
perfusion pressure (CPP) secondary to raised ICP. 
Choosing an appropriate target for each secondary 
insult therapy will enhance the usefulness of the 
database on medical therapy.  Each therapy must be 
assigned a ‘‘Target’’ chosen from a drop down list. 
If drugs are given then one can indicate continuous 
infusion if drugs are delivered by a continuous 
infusion pump or one can indicate boluses if it is 
delivered non-continuously. Figure 1 summarises 
the minimum choice of therapy categories and 
associated targets for the BrainIT core dataset. 
This therapy tracking model has been designed 
to be easily implemented in software.
It is one thing to define on paper a dataset 
and another to actually collect it.  Although a 
paper based feasibility exercise established some 
baseline information, the acid test was still to de-
velop a series of IT-based tools to collect the core 
dataset and to prospectively trial the collection 
of core data from a number of neuro-intensive 
care centres.
A three year follow up EC funded study 
(QLGC-2002-00160) enabled the group to develop 
IT methods to collect the core dataset and to as-
sess the feasibility and accuracy for collection of 
this core-dataset from 22 neuro-intensive care 
centres. The main data collection instrument for 
the “episodic” non-monitoring data was a PDA 
based data collection tool. 
In this system, clinical data is entered by 
bedside nursing staff on hand held PDA’s which 
supported the BrainIT core dataset definition 
through a Java Struts-based tool. This allowed the 
core dataset to be entered by roaming research 
nurses using a set of PDA documents accessed 
via a series of buttons and tabs. With this system, 
indicators were present showing data documents 
which were fully complete, partially complete or 
totally incomplete. When convenient, the PDA 
was connected to a docking station and a client 
program allowed viewing and saving of patient 
data collected. An anonymisation routine removed 
patient identification elements from the collected 
data and labelled the patient data file with a unique 
BrainIT study code generated from the BrainIT 
498  
e-Infrastructures Fostering Multi-Centre Collaborative Research 
web-site. A local database held in each centre 
linked the anonymised data to local centre patient 
id information which was needed during the data 
checking stage of the study. The multi-centre eth-
ics approval precluded connection of the PC client 
system holding the data to any computer connected 
to the Internet. We relied on local research nurses 
to download the anonymised data from the PDA 
system client PC onto a memory stick or CD and 
transfer the data to an Internet connected PC for 
upload of the data to the BrainIT database via the 
website data upload page. 
As this was a multi-centre study collecting data 
from different countries with a range of languages, 
a multi-language implementation was needed to 
foster ease of use by local nursing staff.
A training course was held for the data valida-
tion nursing staff in Glasgow on the use of this 
data collection instrument which also included 
using their medical term and language expertise 
to translate all PDA labels and text output into 
six European languages (English, French, Ger-
man, Spanish, Flemish and Italian).  Data could 
be entered in the local language, exported in an 
XML file format where a table lookup driven by 
an XSL transformation converted the data into a 
standard English language version. 
Data validation research nurse staff were hired 
on a country by country basis to check samples of 
the collected data against gold standard clinical 
record sources in order to quantify the accuracy 
for collection of the BrainIT core-dataset using 
Figure 1. Tracking therapies and targets  
 V entilation Change:   
 Nor mal 
 M ild H yper ventilation (4-4.5kP a) 
 Sever e H yper ventilation (< 4.0 kP a) 
 Other  (Specify) 
Sedation/A nalgesia 
 Y /N 
V olume E xpansion 
 Cr ystalloids 
 C olloids (including P lasma) 
 H yper tonic Saline 
 E r ythr ocytes 
 Other  (Specify) 
I notr opes 
 C atecholamines 
 Other  (Specify) 
A nti-Hyper tensive T her apy 
 B -B locker s 
 A lpha2 A ntagonists 
 Other  (Specify) 
A nti-P yr etic T her apy 
 P ar acetamol 
 C ooling 
 Other  (Specify) 
Cer ebr al V asoconstr iction 
 Dihydr oer gotamine 
 I ndomethacin 
 Other  (Specify) 
Osmotic T her apy 
 M annitol 
 G lycer ol 
 Other  (Specify) 
B ar bitur ates 
 Dose/day 
CSF  Dr ainage 
 Closed 
 I nter mittent Dr ainage 
 Open Dr ainage 
Ster oids 
 Y /N 
H ypother mia 
 Y /N 
H ead E levation  
 Y /N 
Other  T r eatments 
 I nsulin 
 Other  (Specify) 
  
 I CP  
 CPP 
 Neur ological Deter ior ation 
       (eg:  change in G CS, P upils) 
 F ever  
 H yponatr aemia 
 H ypoxia 
 H yper capnia 
 H ypotension 
 SjV O2 desatur ation 
 H yper glycemia 
 Seizur es 
 Other  (Specify)  
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the group IT based data collection methods. Ano-
nymised data was uploaded via the BrainIT web 
upload services were a server side data converter 
tool converted data from centre-based formats 
into BrainIT data format generating data category 
files which were imported into the BrainIT da-
tabase (SQL Server 2000).  A validation request 
tool sampled 20% of the data sent for each data 
category and generated a validation request file 
listing the timestamps and data items to be checked 
by local data validators.  Emails were generated 
to the data validation staff which contained the 
validation data requested documents listing the 
data items to be checked. Data validators entered 
into a data validation tool the requested data 
items for checking from source documentation 
held in each local centre. Validation data was 
then uploaded to the BrainIT data coordinating 
centre via the website and using data validation 
checking software tools, the validated data was 
checked against the data items originally sent from 
which percentage accuracy data was calculated. 
Figure 2 shows the flow of data between a remote 
centre and the BrainIT database with the validation 
procedure selecting a random sample of 20% of 
data items uploaded per data type which are sent 
to data validation (DV) nurses. The DV nurses 
enter requested data into a PC based validation 
data tool, upload the data to the data manager who 
can then check the accuracy of data for each data 
category and estimate an overall error rate. 
As part of this validation process, in addi-
tion to the categorical and numeric clinical data 
being checked for accuracy, the BrainIT system 
also assessed the minute by minute monitoring 
data too. Random samples of monitoring data 
channels uploaded, e.g. ICP, SaO2, were selected 
and validation staff asked to manually enter the 
hourly recorded values from the nurses chart (or 
local gold standard data source) for the first and 
last 24 hour periods of bedside monitoring for a 
given patient for a given channel.  These “valida-
tion” values could then be compared with a range 
of summary measures, e.g. mean, median, from 
the computer based monitoring data acquired 
from the patient. 
To date (mid-2008), 384 TBI patient’s core 
data have been collected from 22 European neuro-
intensive centres. The first 200 patient’s data has 
been cleaned and validation analyses conducted. 
In total, 19,461 comparisons were made between 
collected data elements and source documentation 
data (Shaw 2008). The number of comparisons 
made per data category was in proportion to the 
Figure 2. BrainIT data validation flow of information 
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size of the data received for that category with 
the largest number checked in laboratory data 
(5,667) and the least in the surgery data (567). 
Table 1 summarises error rates by data class. 
Error rates were generally less than or equal to 
6%, the exception being the surgery data class 
where an unacceptably high error rate of 34% 
was found.
With regard to the proportion of surgery errors, 
this was primarily due to the classification system 
used to simplify and thereby reduce the burden of 
data entry. As an example of this, through discus-
sions with local nursing and data validation staff 
it was found that there was particular confusion 
over when to record ICP sensor placement and the 
presence of skull fractures as the primary surgi-
cal procedure. Typically, these procedures occur 
during the same operative procedure. As such, 
confusion over coding these two procedures by 
both the local research nurse and the data valida-
tion nurse accounted for the majority of errors in 
this data category.
To our knowledge, this study conducted by 
the BrainIT group is one of only a few projects to 
attempt to prospectively assess the data capture 
error rate within an academic environment. We 
have shown that it is feasible to collect the BrainIT 
dataset from multiple centres in an international 
setting with human-intensive (research nurse) IT 
based methods and the accuracy of the data col-
lected is greater than or equal to 94%, with the 
exception of the surgery data type which must 
be revised.  We have also shown that computer 
collected minute by minute vital signs data, sum-
marised as end hour averages, correlate well with 
nursing chart end hour recordings. This allows the 
end hour averaged computer records to be used in 
database analyses assessing nurses chart recorded 
detection of events with computer based sampling. 
These validation results calculated on a subset of 
patients provides an estimate of the data quality 
for future analyses on the full patient cohort of 350 
patients collected as part of the EC funded study 
which was conducted over the same time period 
by the same staff using the same data methods. 
Clearly though, future data collection projects will 
generate datasets under differing data collection 
conditions and will require a separate validation 
stage if we wish to maintain our confidence in 
the level of data accuracy. However, the costs 
of maintaining such a data validation network 
are prohibitively high. To maintain a full time 
data validation nurse within each participating 
country costs in excess of 1 Million Euro’s per 
year. Such large running costs for an academic 
network are not sustainable in the long term and 
a more cost-effective solution for data validation 
must be found. 
Table 1. percentage error rate by data type class with common error types
Data Class Error Rate (%) Common Errors
Laboratory 2 pCO2, FiO2 value
Demographic 4 Monitoring on arrival at neurosurgery, 
intubation on arrival at neurosurgery
Neuro Observations 5 Pupil Size, GCSv (code 1 Vs Unknown)
Monitoring Summary 5 ICP type, ICP Location
Daily Management Summary 5 Infusion type (bolus vs infusion or both), 
drug number (1, > 1)
Targeted Therapy 6 Non-standard target, no Target specified
Surgeries 34 ICP placement, Skull #, mass lesion
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3. GrId-bAsEd solutIons to 
brAIn trAuMA rEsEArch 
Grid technology provides middleware that can 
allow distributed federation of data to occur. Dif-
ferent domains have their own requirements on 
how this federation can be achieved. The clinical 
domain in particular demands that strict adherence 
to ethics and information governance is achieved 
which in turn demands fine grained security. 
It is the case that many IT and data storage solu-
tions already exist crossing primary care, second-
ary care and a range of specialised resources such 
as disease registries in the clinical domain. Many 
of these solutions have been developed largely in 
isolation and as a result have widely differing data 
descriptions and associated security policies – or 
in many cases, no security policies other than 
protection at the firewall level provided through 
bodies such as the NHS in the UK. This situa-
tion is greatly magnified when crossing national 
boundaries. Dealing with such heterogeneity from 
the data perspective at least has been one of the 
drivers behind Grid technologies.
Due to the sensitivity of data, the establishment 
of security policies and their rigorous enforcement 
is of paramount importance in the clinical domain. 
It is clear that a single static system accessing a 
closed/fixed set of data will not meet the needs 
of healthcare providers nor researchers using the 
clinical data sets. Systems and data sets evolve. 
Different researchers may be allowed access to a 
given clinical data set for a given time after ap-
plying specifically for ethical approval to do so. 
Instead, software and tools are required to build 
infrastructures where a variety of data can be 
made accessible to different individuals for dif-
ferent times for different reasons. A cornerstone 
of these solutions is in ensuring fine grained 
security. However it is an unavoidable fact that 
the specific privileges required in a particular 
trial or study will not be known when the system 
is first created. Similarly a doctor in one hospital 
may have privileges to access various systems 
in that hospital, but these do not transfer directly 
when this doctor attends a different hospital for 
example. Therefore systems capable of adding and 
removing resources or privileges “on the fly” are 
necessary, where the corresponding allocation of 
privileges can be added or removed depending 
on the needs of different trials or healthcare sys-
tems. In Grid parlance, the framework by which 
such rules and regulations on the resources and 
the users that may access them and under what 
conditions is given by the concept of a Virtual 
Organisation (VO). 
The basic models put forward for the majority 
of Grid-based security systems can be broadly 
broken down into the “AAA” categories:
• Authentication – establishing the identity 
of the person requesting access to a re-
source.
•  Authorization – having established identity, 
establishing and enforcing what that person 
is allowed to do on a given resource.
•  Accountability – being able to establish the 
activities, and time of activities, of a particu-
lar person on that resource (or resources) so 
that they can not subsequently deny potential 
misuse later on (non-repudiation). 
Of course there are other important aspects 
when considering the wider challenges of build-
ing secure systems. For example in the clinical 
domain, confidentiality and data integrity are 
essential, but in this chapter we restrict ourselves 
to authentication and authorisation as these are 
arguably the most important things to get right 
in the first instance. Put another way if authen-
tication and authorisation are not adequately 
addressed, then other aspects of security are 
largely redundant 
Methods of authentication with grid technol-
ogy tend to favour two methods, either username/
password combinations or public key infrastruc-
tures (PKIs) (Housley 2001). The latter are used 
to set up and use safer, encrypted communication 
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channels through trusting a third party root of 
trust Certification Authority (CA) such as the 
UK e-Science CA (www.grid-support.ac.uk/ca). 
Authentication is focused upon identity man-
agement and a process exists through which a 
user establishes their identity to obtain an X.509 
digital certificate (ITU-T X509, 2001). Typically 
this is through showing some form of physical 
identification to a local registration authority at 
their institution. However there are issues with 
this process, not least of which is the complex-
ity of converting certificates to formats suitable 
for usage on the Grid and with the lack of local 
identity management. Furthermore, a user might 
be expelled from their institution but still have 
access to a valid Grid certificate. These issues are 
described in more detail in (Sinnott, 2006; Stell, 
2006; Watt, 2006; Ajayi, 2006).
One approach to overcoming the issues with 
PKI based identity management is through ex-
ploitation of local identity management systems. 
The Internet2 Shibboleth technology has been 
developed to fulfil this need (Internet2 ShibArch, 
2006, Internet2 ShibProt, 2006). In essence, Shib-
boleth provides a method of securely transferring 
attributes between institutions subscribing to an 
over-arching federation. The basic model of Shib-
boleth is that institutions enter into federations, 
or more precisely federated access management 
federations. Users at those institutions attempting 
to access remote resources across the federation 
(typically service providers) are redirected to their 
home institution (typically through a Where Are 
You From service) where they log in locally. A 
digitally signed Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) (OASIS SAML, 2003) assertion 
showing that the user has authenticated is then 
delivered to the target resource which may then 
decide whether access is granted or not. Often 
further information such as attributes for autho-
risation need to be returned. This whole process 
however is transparent to the end users who only 
log in to their local system with the normal user-
names and passwords.  
The key benefit of Shibboleth is that end users 
have simple ways to access resources.  Further-
more depending upon local policies and trust 
relationships across the federation, users are able 
to access a range of distributed resources thereby 
supporting single sign-on. Once a secure session 
between a user and a resource is established, the 
user can access further resources (in the same 
federation) without the need to further authen-
ticate – based upon browser-based information. 
Additionally since their authentication is tied to 
their local institution, they will have their federa-
tion privileges revoked, if they are revoked locally 
(which is the most likely scenario).
Authentication is only a starting point with 
regard to security however. Knowing that someone 
has authenticated at the University of Glasgow is 
not likely (indeed very unlikely) to allow access to 
a remote clinical data set. Instead authorisation is 
required. Unlike authentication which has a rea-
sonably mature body of software and approaches 
in supporting the process of its application, au-
thorisation is a much more fluid area. Numerous 
competing software solutions and standards exist 
with their own advantages and disadvantages. 
A comparison of these and overview of some 
of their advantages and disadvantages is given 
in (Sinnott, 2005; Stell, 2005). It is essential in 
the clinical domain that any solution put forward 
for security is simple both for the end users, but 
equally importantly for the clinical data provider 
IT-administrators. These will typically be unlikely 
to have any experience with Grid-based systems. 
As such, solutions are required which provide 
them with capabilities to easily manage secure 
access to their local data according to agreed 
information governance policies. 
One of the more mature authorisation-based 
approaches is based upon role based access 
control (RBAC) (Sandhu, 1996). In this model, 
roles are created which offer a given privilege 
and subsequently assigned to trusted individuals. 
Several approaches for creation of these roles and 
their assignment are possible including federated 
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models, centralised models or hybrid approaches 
of the two. The pros and cons of such role based 
creation and assignment is described in (Sinnott, 
2008). 
Once these roles are created and assigned 
to individuals they can be used to enforce finer 
grained authorisation at given data provider sites. 
To actually enforce these authorisation decisions, 
several software solutions can be adopted. The 
PERMIS RBAC (Chadwick, 2002) offers one 
such solution for role definition, assignment and 
its use in enforcing local access control. Anther 
popular solution is Virtual Organisation Mem-
bership Service (VOMS) (Alfieri, 2003) which 
provides a centralised repository of VO-roles and 
has been shown to interoperate with PERMIS in 
(Chadwick 2002). An essential part of authorisa-
tion is in understanding both when and how an 
authorisation decision needs to be made. The X812 
standard (ITUT X812, 1995) defines concepts 
such as policy enforcement points (PEP) and 
policy decision points (PDP) which define a ge-
neric approach for deciding where (PEP) and how 
(PDP) authorisation decisions should be made. 
Trust plays a crucial role in any security system 
however, and the allocation of privileges and their 
use for authorisation needs to be augmented with 
user guidelines and agreements on best practices 
on accessing and using clinical data according to 
ethics and information governance.
To understand how these security concepts can 
be applied in the brain trauma domain, the Na-
tional e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the University 
of Glasgow has undertaken a range of case studies 
exploring authorisation and Shibboleth technolo-
gies applied in the clinical domain. This work 
was undertaken as part of the Joint Information 
Systems Committee (JISC) funded GLASS (www.
nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/glass) and the Medical 
Research Council funded VOTES (www.nesc.
ac.uk/hub/projects/votes) projects. 
 The VOTES project focused on realising a 
software solution meeting the challenges inherent 
in federating distributed clinical data, specifically 
in supporting the various stages of clinical trials 
and epidemiological studies such as patient re-
cruitment; data collection and study management. 
The GLASS project was primarily focused upon 
the roll out of Shibboleth technology across the 
University of Glasgow and exploring its suitability 
in a range of e-Science and non-e-Science appli-
cations, e.g. to provide access to student records 
for authorised individuals in Glasgow. 
Usability is at the heart of VOTES efforts 
and portal based solutions have been prototyped 
with this in mind. As identified previously, this 
usability should be for end users, administrators, 
investigators and the other stakeholders involved 
in clinical trials and studies. To support this, a 
Figure 3. VOTES node infrastructure and clinical VO overlays
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node infrastructure supporting the addition or 
removal of institutions and the resources that they 
wish to contribute is needed. This should support 
fine grained user-oriented VO-specific security. 
Figure 3 shows an overall schematic representa-
tion of such a VO.
In this infrastructure, each node provides 
access to its resources according to local poli-
cies. A key part of this infrastructure is that it 
supports both heterogeneous data resources but 
equally importantly heterogeneous security in-
frastructures. Thus sites may recognise certain 
roles associated with a given clinical trial or not 
as the case may be. Furthermore, these roles and 
the privileges that are associated with them will 
have different interpretations at each site. Thus a 
clinical nurse role at one node might be allowed to 
query a range of clinical data including identify-
ing data, whilst the same nurse role at a different 
site may be restricted to only accessing statistical 
information, e.g. the number of patients with a 
particular Glasgow Coma Score without knowing 
any further information on those patients.
The VOTES infrastructure supports a variety 
of Grid components to support secure access to 
federated clinical data. These include Grid ser-
vices developed with the Globus toolkit version 
4 (www.globus.org) and data federation technol-
ogy such as the Open Grid Service Architecture 
Data Access and Integration (OGSA-DAI) tech-
nology (www.ogsadai.org.uk). The interface to 
the systems themselves is through portal based 
technologies based upon GridSphere (www.
gridsphere.org).
To understand the interplay of role based access 
to federated resources we consider the scenario of 
a particular BrainIT trial undertaken with Glas-
gow Southern General Hospital. In this model we 
identified different roles that could access differ-
ent demographic, physiological and monitoring 
data. For simplicity we simply assigned these 
roles directly to known and trusted individuals at 
Glasgow. This assignment was based upon adding 
the appropriate signed attribute certificates to the 
appropriate individuals in the Glasgow Identity 
Provider (IdP) given as an LDAP server although 
other authentication systems are possible. Exten-
sions and refinements to this scenario allowing 
for example the delegation of these privileges is 
also supported through the JISC funded DyVOSE 
project (www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/projects/dyvose). In 
this model, the privileges (roles) can be pushed 
to remote trusted administrators who can sub-
sequently assign them to local staff or students 
involved in that particular VO for example. Simi-
larly, adding the attributes to separate attribute 
authorities (AAs) is supported rather than to a 
single institutional IdP. In this case, a user would 
log in to their IdP and the appropriate attributes 
linked and pushed (or pulled) from separate AAs 
set up for specific VOs. This linkage is possible 
through having unique identities in place across 
institutions and is described in more detail in 
(Sinnott, 2007; Watt, 2007). 
When a user attempts to access the BrainIT 
portal, they are redirected to their home institu-
tions when they are asked to authenticate. After 
authenticating, the attributes needed for access 
to the BrainIT portal for authorised access to the 
federated clinical data are returned in a signed 
SAML assertion. We note that the tools for scop-
ing of attributes, e.g. which sites to trust, and for 
defining and enforcing attribute release policies, 
e.g. to determine which attributes should be 
released to which sites have been implemented 
in the SPAM-GP project (www.nesc.ac.uk/hub/
projects/spam-gp). The portal will then use these 
attributes to configure the contents of the portal, 
i.e. the users are restricted to see and do what their 
roles dictate. This is shown in Figure 4 where 
two different users have logged in to the system 
- one with the brainit-investigator role (right side) 
and one with the brainit-nurse role (left side). 
The former role has superior privileges in this 
particular trial and hence is allowed access to a 
wider range of information within the context of 
that trial, e.g. the GCS, the ICP, Glucose levels as 
well as identifying patient information. The nurse 
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role on the other hand is restricted to a subset of 
non-patient identifying information.
For clinical data providers, it is unlikely that 
they would simply allow access to their resources 
based upon a role which has been used to configure 
a portal where the portal itself may well exist out-
side of their own domain of control. The VOTES 
e-Infrastructure has been designed with security 
throughout however. This includes security of the 
local Grid and data services as well as security at 
potentially remote data providers so that they are 
able to make their own autonomous authorisation 
decisions. Thus the roles are used to configure the 
portal, but then importantly the distributed data 
providers accessible from this portal have their 
own local authorisation policies which must be 
satisfied by the information provided to the portal. 
It is quite possible that further information than 
the supplied role needs to be obtained before a 
given access decision is made. This might be a 
notification from an ethical oversight committee 
for example. The infrastructure allows for a range 
of authorisation possibilities to be supported, 
including scenarios where additional attributes 
from one or more attribute authorities are re-
quired to authorise specific requests. Examples 
of these different kinds of model are described 
in (Stell, 2008). 
We note that data security offers challenges that 
existing Grid security infrastructures are not well 
aligned to and hence cannot be easily supported. 
In large scale federated data infrastructures, it is 
often the case that access to individual subsets 
of data within different federated repositories is 
required. Many mainstream Grid based solutions 
today work primarily at securing services or 
methods that services support. Whilst it is pos-
sible to develop targeted services to specific data 
resources for a nurse or an investigator, a more 
scalable solution is to have one or more generic 
services that differ in the security models that 
they offer. Thus, to support a range of studies 
it should not be necessary to support individual 
services at each service provider for each study. 
Rather, the ideal scenario is to have a single data 
access service, which can distinguish between the 
different trial/study specific security identifiers. 
To support such scenarios, the VOTES project has 
Figure 4. Role-based access to portal and restrictions to data access
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implemented RBAC models based upon access 
control matrices. With these models, users and 
roles are defined with specific relationships over 
the data models themselves at each data provider. 
Thus, a given data provider may decide that a 
subset of their tables should be made available 
with specific columns and rows accessible for 
different roles within a given study. Through 
tools and services implemented in VOTES it is 
possible to associate those users and their roles 
with specific subsets of the databases. Details on 
how this is supported, is described in (Sinnott, 
2008) along with the benefits and drawbacks 
compared to other RBAC systems. This model 
is based on the premise that the access matrix 
will be available at every node in the VO and 
will be regularly updated. Consequently, every 
user that has access to the VO in some form will 
go through this matrix model to access any other 
resource, be it local or remote, within the VO with 
each data provider defining its own local access 
policies for each role.
Having defined the roles and local policies 
on how these are interpreted when enforcing 
policy decisions it is necessary to consider the 
ramifications of the data sets that are made 
available through the combination of the poli-
cies. Thus a given provider might be completely 
satisfied that the data sets that they release are 
in accordance with local policy and information 
governance frameworks. However, when linked 
or joined with other sets, the consequences need 
to be understood within the context of the VO. 
For example, a provider may be happy to release 
anonymised data but if this is linked with other 
data sets containing identifying data for given 
patients for example, then this needs to be clearly 
understood by all stakeholders across the VO. We 
note that it is also possible to link data and remove 
(anonymised) the fields that have been used for 
the data linkage. The algorithms for supporting 
these kinds of scenarios are described in detail 
in (Ajayi, 2008). 
The typical interactions of the components 
involved in supporting the access to and usage of 
federated resources is as follows. Firstly the user 
must log into the portal either through Shibboleth 
or directly. In the Shibboleth case the various user 
roles and privileges are provided to personalise/
authorise their access to a variety of services as 
described above. To achieve this, the portal server 
checks the local resource files to discover the 
available grid servers, data servers and associ-
ated databases accessible to this particular user 
with the associated privileges. The appropriate 
Grid service consults the local access matrix 
and returns the parameters for the resources that 
the user can query for that particular trial. These 
are presented to the user as a list of check-boxes, 
with the option to specify conditions if desired 
(as shown in Figure 4). Following this, the user 
makes their selection of parameters and submits 
them. These are constructed into a query which 
is distributed, i.e. federated, across the various 
resources associated with that particular trial. To 
support this query distribution, the query is sent 
from the Grid server to the data server, where 
it is wrapped as an OGSA-DAI service request 
before being passed to a local driving database. 
This driving database subsequently co-ordinates 
the execution of the distributed queries over the 
resources associated with that trial. Where pos-
sible, for example where web services are offered 
and no-direct connections to a remote database 
are offered or possible, the federating of the 
sub-queries can result in combinations of direct 
database queries through JDBC for example, as 
well as SOAP messaging to remote services. Once 
all sub-queries are returned the results are joined 
together and returned for display in the portal after 
conversion to HTML. We note that it is quite pos-
sible for the results to be stored into databases for 
future access by researchers. The actual joining of 
results itself is made possible through the unique 
identifier assigned to patients in Scotland – the 
Community Health Index number. This greatly 
simplifies the development of federated queries 
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since a unique joining key is available. In other 
situations, this is not always available hence other 
mechanisms and identifiers have to be identified 
through which data linkage can be made. This 
might be based upon study specific identifiers gen-
erated for particular patients. With this approach, 
joining of data within a given neurological centre 
can be achieved however joining across centres 
is not possible. Since it is unlikely that the same 
individual will be found in different neurological 
data centres, this is not overly constraining. Rather 
in this case queries are federated to the different 
centres, the data joined on local identifiers, and 
then returned to the portal where the union for 
example of the data sets can be made. The result 
of a particular query is shown in Figure 5.
In the results shown in Figure 5 we see the 
DICOM images and various physiological data 
associated with a given patient that includes 
any changes in their condition or their overall 
Glasgow Coma Score in response to the specific 
treatments they may be receiving. A variety of 
other information can be returned in the existing 
systems including the current treatment, ICP 
measurements amongst other factors.
The above systems were developed in a con-
trolled test-bed at the NeSC in Glasgow. This 
comprised a variety of SQL Server, MySQL and 
Oracle databases hosting the various neurological 
data sets as well as a consent database. 
4. futurE trEnds
The above systems have shown the proof of con-
cept upon which clinical data can be accessed 
and used within a secure framework. There are 
numerous enhancements to this system that are 
being explored within the AVERT-IT project. We 
outline upon some of these here since we believe 
they capture future trends in Grid-enabled brain 
trauma research. Firstly, it is clear that the models 
and systems described here need to deal with the 
actual concerns regarding access to and usage of 
live systems supporting multi-centre trials. Proof 
of concept VOs and federated authorization sys-
tems as described here need to reflect the particular 
needs and requirements of particular neurological 
data centres. In particular it is essential to under-
stand what data needs to be made accessible and 
Figure 5. Results of executing a particular brain trauma query
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linked across the various centres and importantly 
for what reason. Within the AVERT-IT project we 
propose to capture near real time information from 
the various neurological data centres to explore 
the potential prediction of hypotensive events. 
To support this, we are exploring how determi-
nation of hypotensive event might be predicted 
via empirical analysis, univariate analysis and 
multivariable linear regression techniques of the 
weighted association between multiple patient 
parameters (drawn from demographic, periodic 
and episodic datasets) and subsequent arterial 
hypotension. This association will then form the 
basis for the initial definition of a novel Bayesian 
Neural Network, to be trained against the BrainIT 
dataset prior to undertaking a novel clinical trial 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the AVERT-IT 
project concept.
From a technological perspective, the AVERT-
IT system will focus on the development of a 
novel IT-based decision support system (“Hy-
poPredict”), appropriate for deployment within 
intensive and high dependency care units which 
is capable of:
• Automatically and continually monitoring at 
least four in-vivo patient parameters (ECG, 
arterial blood pressure, Oxygen saturation 
and core temperature), together with open 
interfaces providing input of key demo-
graphic data (age, gender etc.) and periodic 
data (clinical pathology results etc.) related 
to the patient.
• Outputting a continuous Hypotension Pre-
diction Index (HPi) in the range 0 – 100 (0 = 
no risk; 100 = patient is currently hypoten-
sive);
• Providing primary (P1) and secondary 
(P2) weighted (0-100; 0 = not considered 
relevant; 100 = critical importance) causal 
data (current values of input parameters) 
in parallel with HPi to facilitate appropri-
ate intervention selection by clinician (for 
example, elevated core temperature could be 
indicative of sepsis, a common precursor to 
hypotension);
• Providing updated HPi, P1 and P2 values 
immediately changes are detected in the 
patient parameter input set.
Such predictive approaches offer one of the 
greatest opportunities from the application of Grid 
middleware to link different clinical data centres. 
Can we determine the best way to treat individuals 
suffering major brain trauma thereby extending 
the state of the art knowledge in brain trauma 
treatment from initial assessment, diagnosis and 
treatment to continued software support systems 
which augment the whole process of improved 
healthcare and treatment.  We emphasis here that 
these systems are not and are never intended as 
a replacement for informed clinical decisions in 
brain trauma patient management, but as a guide 
and tool that helps intensivists and brain trauma 
specialists better understand the whole course of 
brain trauma treatment with improved monitoring 
and diagnostics. 
 However from past and on-going experience in 
projects such as VOTES, we recognise the direct 
transfer of Grid technology within a clinical set-
ting often requires a degree of pragmatism and 
especially consideration of the clinical IT staff 
and their existing systems in place. As noted it is 
unrealistic to expect a hospital IT administrator 
to be knowledgeable in Grid and/or advanced 
authorisation technologies. Furthermore, one of 
the major issues with most Grid middleware to-
day is their lack of stability. This in turn directly 
impacts upon the validation of the software. 
Before widespread take up of Grid middleware 
in the clinical domain can be achieved, software 
validation is needed. This has to ensure both that 
the middleware satisfies the basic tests that it is 
fit for purpose, but also that it is resilient enough 
to withstand attempts at breaking the software 
from third parties, e.g. hackers. This has not been 
the focus until now, but is clearly needed for the 
wider community to have faith. To address such 
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aspects within the AVERT-IT systems we are 
initially proposing models based upon pushed 
data transfer only, i.e. the clinical data provider 
firewalls will reject all incoming data requests, 
but will push data out of their firewalls into 
demilitarised zones set up as a buffer between 
the Grid research domain and the domain of live 
healthcare provision. It is our intention, however to 
eventually develop systems that allow to integrate 
the various neurological data sets within a given 
clinical data provider domain and push them out 
of the firewall. In supporting this, we are acutely 
aware of the pragmatic approach that is needed 
and are not yet proposing any overly complicated 
middleware solutions, but instead focusing upon 
lighter-weight data integration clients that can 
query various clinical data resources directly, 
e.g. over JDBC or ODBC connections before 
anonymising, encrypting and ultimately sending 
them to the centralised AVERT-IT repository ac-
cessible to the partner sites. We are currently in the 
progress of evaluating the different data models 
and software used within the individual partner 
sites and how these map onto the BrainIT core 
data set identified previously so that the queries 
to extract the needed data sets can be defined and 
implemented in the lightweight clients. This is 
non-trivial given the international dimension of 
the AVERT-IT project which involves collabora-
tors from the UK, Sweden, Italy, Germany and 
Lithuania with each site having their own software 
and data infrastructures.
One challenge that remains to be solved in 
the AVERT-IT system and within the wider 
e-Research community more generally is with 
regard to real time or near real-time data. Moni-
toring data that needs to be streamed to support 
the Bayesian adverse event prediction algorithms 
offers new challenges that have hitherto not been 
addressed within the VOTES project for example. 
In this case, it is likely that data streaming models 
with authorisation capabilities are supported, or 
enhancements to systems that allow for frequent 
periodic queries to be undertaken with periods 
of the order of 5 minutes or less being likely. 
This is made further challenging since these near 
real-time data sets need to be joined with other 
non-real time data sets each time. Obviously to 
predict the onset of an adverse hypotensive event, 
the closer to real time the information is the better 
and more accurate the identification will be and 
hence less false positives identified.
 These challenges are not specific to the brain 
trauma domain but apply more generally to wider 
healthcare support where real time information 
to patient information is essential. However 
real time access to patient data even by clinical 
healthcare providers is often a fraught process 
as exemplified by the recent furore in the UK to 
establish a national consent database (Guardian, 
2007). It is interesting to note here that many 
patients were largely in favour of such national 
data resources for improved healthcare, whereas 
general practitioners and trusts where more 
reluctant to make their patient data available to 
national-level resources. 
5. conclusIon
The Grid paradigm provides a compelling model 
for secure access to clinical data and the proof of 
concept systems have shown that this vision of 
seamless access to federated data can be made 
a reality. We recognise that a proof of concept 
system and a live system that has been validated 
requires a step change in the way in which Grid 
based systems are currently developed. The Grid 
middleware evolution or revolution in many cases 
needs to solidify to hardened software stacks that 
clinical and healthcare providers understand and 
are comfortable in supporting. Indeed the Grid 
community as a whole need to agree upon best 
practice of establishing the numerous different 
flavours of Grids that exist. Why should software 
developed for distributing petabytes of elementary 
particle data from the Large Hadron Collider in 
CERN be applicable to accessing a hospital data-
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base in Scotland? Surprisingly, such applications 
of Grid middleware are still being explored. From 
direct experience of working with healthcare pro-
viders and their IT support staff, the deployment 
of complex open source Grid middleware stacks 
from a variety of sources will never be accepted. 
It is essential that in future health Grid efforts this 
is recognised and a common core set of function-
ality agreed upon, documented and the detailed 
pro’s and con’s of such software defined for others 
to use. It is the case that the weakest link in any 
system is the one that will be exploited. Ensuring 
that all nodes within a particular VO understand 
the consequences of being in that VO for all 
parties is crucial. Similarly, whilst compromises 
of Grid facilities can be accepted to a degree in 
some domains, the healthcare domain is not one 
of them. The reputation of the Grid is perhaps 
as important to convince healthcare providers 
to provide access to their resources via the Grid 
as are the Grid technologies themselves. The 
authentication-only based models of most large 
scale Grids such as the National Grid Service 
(www.ngs.ac.uk) in the UK will not convince 
these providers – thus it will never be the case 
that a researcher is allowed access to a clinical 
provider database to “do stuff”. Rather, clearly 
defined rules and regulations on what can be ac-
cessed and used and in what context are needed, 
and Grid technologies need to demonstrably 
support this process.
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kEy tErMs And dEfInItIons
Adverse Hypotensive Event: Hypotension 
lasting 5 minutes or longer falling below the com-
monly accepted threshold of 90 mmHg systolic 
OR 70 mmHg mean pressure.
Authentication: The act of establishing or 
confirming something or someone as authentic. In 
the security domain this might for example involve 
electronically confirming the identity of a person 
wishing to access a given software or hardware 
resource. Authentication can be achieved in many 
ways, e.g. usernames/passwords, certificate based 
systems etc. 
Authorisation: The process of restricting ac-
cess to resources only to those permitted to use 
them. In the security domain this will typically 
entail the definition of security policies associ-
ated with resources, the assignment of privileges 
to individuals that should be able to access those 
resources and the subsequent enactment of those 
policies when requests for access are received 
by individuals. Standards have been identified 
to support both the definition of policies, where 
access decisions need to be enforced, and how 
such decisions are made. Authorisation typically 
augments authentication and allows finer grained 
access control to be supported. 
Certificate Authority (CA): An entity which 
issues digital certificates for use by other parties 
(including individuals and computers). Through 
trusting a CA and the process by which it issues 
and revokes certificates, the certificates can be 
used for accessing multiple resources seamlessly 
to support one of the basic tenets of Grid: single 
sign-on. 
Glasgow Coma Score (GCS): Widely used 
clinical score assessing brain stem function fol-
lowing a suspected brain injury.
Hypotension: Abnormally low blood pres-
sure which can be especially dangerous for brain 
injury patients.
Pressor: Pharmacological agent which acts 
to increase the work of the heart and often in-
cludes actions on increasing systemic vascular 
resistance towards raising blood pressure when 
hypotensive.
Registration Authority (RA): Typically 
an individual at an institution that supports the 
processes required by a CA to verify the identity 
of individuals applying for digital certificates. 
Typically this is through the certificate requestor 
presenting in person a visual identity such as 
a passport or student matriculation card to the 
RA. 
Single Sign-On: The ability to securely access 
and use a variety of distributed resources without 
the need for multiple usernames/passwords or 
authentication challenge/responses. In the Grid 
world this is typically achived through trust of 
the CA that issued the certificate and local policy 
on whether that individual with that certificate 
is allowed access. For many Grids, this can be 
through a mapping of the Distinguished Name 
associated with the certificate to a local system 
account. 
